I study the weighted updating model, a generalization of Bayesian updating that allows for biased beliefs by weighting the functions that constitute Bayes' rule with real exponents. I show that weighting a distribution affects the information entropy of the resulting distribution, suggesting that weighted updating can model biases in which individuals misperceive the information content of data. I augment the base model in two ways, allowing weighted updating to account for additional biases. The first expansion involves discrimination between data. The second allows the weights to vary over time. I also find sufficient conditions for the uniqueness of a maximum of the weighted updating model and that log-concavity plays a key role. As an applied example, I detail how the model can show that self attribution bias can lead to optimism bias.
Introduction
The last several decades have witnessed the accumulation of overwhelming evidence suggesting that we humans do not always form beliefs rationally, according to Bayes' rule. Rather, we consistently and systematically exhibit a number of biases that tend to distort our perception of reality. Well known among such biases are the availability heuristic, wherein an event associated with more memorable occurrences is deemed more likely to recur. Another is the gambler's fallacy, where sequences of events are believed to exhibit greater negative autocorrelation than they actually have.
1 Despite this accumulation of evidence, there is no widely accepted, general model of such biases. The purpose of this paper is to suggest a model that is useful in the study of many of these biases. The model involves exponentially weighting the two determinant components of Bayes' rule, the likelihood function and the prior distribution. As such, this paper refers to this model as weighted updating.
The weighted updating model has seen some use in the economics literature.
2 Grether (1980) and Grether (1992) provide empirical evidence for the representativeness heuristic by estimating the weights on the likelihood function and the prior distribution. In recent theoretical work, Benjamin, Rabin, and Raymond (2011) model "non-belief in the law of large numbers" using the weighted updating model.
1 See Rabin (1996) and DellaVigna (2009) for surveys of the literature at the intersection of psychology and economics, including detailed discussion of many belief perturbing biases.
2 There has been some work that utilizes models similar to weighted updating outside of economics. Ibrahim and Chen (2000) introduced power priors, a methodology that allows the statistician to consider data from previous studies by finding a weight in (0, 1) to put on that data while maintaining a weight of 1 on current data. This can be viewed as a case of weighted updating wherein the statistician rationally discriminates between different batches of data. In the logic literature, Van Benthem, Gerbrandy, and Kooi (2009) define a "weighted product updating rule" and show that Bayes' rule and the Jeffrey updating rule are both special cases.
The current paper takes a multifaceted approach to support its suggestion for utilizing weighted updating to model certain biases. In doing so, the paper expands upon the weighted updating literature in several ways. The paper strives for generality throughout, allowing results to be applicable to a wide range of models. A major part of this involves studying general distributions, rather than particular families of distributions. This contrasts with the previous literature on weighted updating, as Grether (1980) , Grether (1992) , and Benjamin, Rabin, and Raymond (2011) each focus exclusively on Bernoulli random variables, thereby limiting their analyses to distributions from the beta-binomial family.
Section 2 introduces the model and discusses how it is usually the case that both weights are necessary for a full description of an agent's beliefs. It also explores the implications of weighting distributions, finding that weighting necessitates a change in the information entropy. Whether entropy decreases or increases depends on whether the weight is greater or less than one. This provides the interpretation that weighting is a parametric method with which to model the treatment of data as either more or less informative than with Bayesian updating. As such, weighted updating embodies a theory of biased judgement, wherein these biases are a result of the treatment of data as containing inaccurate levels of information content.
This interpretation of weighting a distribution suggests that, on its own, weighted updating may be appropriate to model only those biases in which individuals correctly interpret information, but for some reason do not use the information in a rational way. Thus, for example, weighted updating may be utilized to model biases based on self-deception 3 or the cognitive limitations of utilizing correctly interpreted data, but it may not be appropriate for modelling the type of confirmation bias studied by Rabin and Schrag (1999) , which involves decision makers who misinterpret information. Still, there is no reason why there should be only one type of bias affecting belief formation; one could, for example, model individuals who misinterpret evidence using the framework of Rabin and Schrag (1999) and then have agents in the model process the misinterpreted information irrationally using weighted updating.
The paper goes on, in Section 3, to discuss how other transformations can be applied to distributions to achieve these ends, but exponential weighting seems to be unique amongst all such transformations in that it does so parsimoniously while typically maintaining tractability (since the resulting distribution is often from the same family of distributions as the original).
Section 4 details two ways in which the base model can be expanded, allowing weighted updating to model several biases it otherwise could not. Previous studies that utilize the weighted updating model all implicitly assume that if non-prior information is mis-weighted then each datum is mis-weighted by the same factor.
Section 4.1 discusses how it is possible to relax this restriction. In particular, this more general version of weighted updating allows one to model those biases that involve discrimination between non-prior pieces of information as with, for example, order effects 4 and self-attribution bias. 5 Section 4.2 relaxes another implicit assumption from the previous literature, namely that weights do not change over time.
Section 5 considers the problem of finding point estimates of distribution pa-4 Order effects are when the order of data affects the beliefs those data are based upon. For example, the recency and primacy effect respectively describe cases where more or less recent data have more salience in belief formation.
5 Self-attribution bias involves attributing desirable events to internal factors (such as ability) while attributing undesirable outcomes to bad luck or external factors.
rameters by way of maximizing the weighted posterior distribution. The main result of this section provides a set of sufficient conditions for maximization which are satisfied by many workhorse distributions. As the implicit function theorem is utilized in this result, it also provides comparative static conditions.
To illustrate how the weighted updating model might be applied, Section 6 utilizes the main result from Section 5 to show how optimism bias can result from self-attribution bias. Section 7 concludes.
Interpreting the Weights
This section formally introduces the weighted updating model. It also shows that weighting a distribution by a positive constant results in a monotone dispersion (if the constant is less than one) or concentration (if the constant is greater than one) of that distribution, and that this necessarily results in a change in the information entropy. These results provide the interpretation that the weights determine how informative a decision maker is treating the observations on which beliefs are based.
Throughout the paper, h t denotes a t-tuple consisting of an ordered history of observations (x 1 , . . . , x t ). A decision maker will consider h t as an outcome from a stochastic process with density f (h t |θ), where θ is an unknown parameter that the decision maker considers to be from parameter space Θ. Bayesian beliefs regarding the value of θ after observing h t are completely described by the posterior distribution π(θ|h t ). Denote the likelihood function with f (h t |θ) and the prior distribution with π(θ), then Bayes' rule states that
Weighted updating augments Bayes' rule with real-valued parameters α and β as exponents respectively on the likelihood function and prior probability distribution. Denoting the posterior distribution under weighted updating after observing history h t byπ(θ|h t ), this form of weighted updating is given by
Both Bayes' rule and the weighted updating model can be stated without mention of the marginal distribution, which is not a function of θ and serves only as a normalization, ensuring that the posterior distribution aggregates to one over its support. Thus, the weighted updating model can be displayed as
Monotone Concentration and Monotone Dispersion
Stating the model as in expression (1 ) emphasizes how the nature of the posterior distribution depends solely on the interaction between the prior distribution and the likelihood distribution, and how the weights α and β affect this interaction.
Consider how an exponent γ transforms one probability distribution g(y) to another proportional to g(y) γ . As long as γ > 0 taking g(y) to the power γ for all y is a monotone transformation, as is dividing by the resulting marginal distribution, which is always positive. As such, the values of y that maximize (or minimize) g 6 Note that throughout the paper it is assumed that the denominator Θ f (h t |θ) β π(θ) α dθ is finite so thatπ(θ|h t ) is well-defined. For many cases this assumption is innocuous because weighting a distribution with an exponent and rescaling results in a distribution from the original family. However, this assumption is not always satisfied. For example, the function (1 − p)x −p represents a distribution over x ≥ 1 if and only if p > 1. Taking such a distribution to a power α < 1/p and doing the usual normalization does not result in another distribution, as the integral over [1, ∞) of the resulting function diverges. and g γ are identical.
What the exponent γ affects is the concentration of the resulting distribution.
The following definition states these notions precisely.
7
Definition 1 (Monotone Dispersion, Monotone Concentration). For two nonuniform probability distributions Γ and g on the same support Ω, Γ is a monotone dispersion of g if for all pairs (ω 1 , ω 2 ) ∈ Ω 2 it is true that
If Γ is a monotone dispersion of g then g is a monotone concentration of Γ.
8
See Figure 1 for an example of two distributions that are monotone dispersion and concentrations of one another.
Interest in monotone dispersions and concentrations is due to the fact that when a distribution is weighted with a positive power and normalized, the resulting distribution is either a monotone dispersion or concentration of the original distribution depending on whether the weight is less than or greater than one, as stated in the following theorem.
In a previous version of this paper, the concept of a monotone dispersion was given the name "monotone spread", a related concept due to Quiggin (1988) . Note that a monotone dispersion differs from a monotone spread in that the latter is necessarily mean-preserving.
8 Uniform distributions are excluded from Definition 1 because if either g or Γ were uniform then the other would necessarily be uniform by condition (2), so they would be the same distribution. If this is the case then conditions (3) and (4) are only vacuously true, which is not useful for our purposes because condition (4) provides an asymmetry that allows one to compare different distributions. Another way of saying this is that such a restriction ensures that the relations "is a monotone dispersion of" and "is a monotone concentration of" are not symmetric.
9 Proofs for all results are supplied in the appendix. Theorem 1. Let g : Ω → R be any non-uniform probability distribution. If
is a monotone dispersion of g. If it is the case that γ > 1 then Γ is a monotone concentration of g. Expression (4) describes how the cardinal properties of a monotone dispersion or concentration differ from the original function, with a monotone dispersion being closer to a uniform distribution. Equivalently, a concentration is an exaggeration of the original distribution, with "higher highs" and "lower lows". The following theorem states these notions rigorously.
Theorem 2. Let Γ be a monotone dispersion of g. For any ω 1 , ω 2 ∈ Ω,
Also,
The following Corollary 10 to Theorem 2 is used in the proof of Theorem 3, which is stated below.
Corollary 1. Let Γ be a monotone dispersion of g and let ω * be a maximizer of
Measuring Dispersion
As variance is a widely used measure of dispersion, one may suspect that a monotone dispersion results in a distribution with greater variance and a monotone concentration less variance than the original distribution. For many distributions this is indeed the case. Consider the normal distribution with mean µ and variance σ 2 . It is straightforward to find that taking this distribution to the power γ > 0 results in a function that is proportional to the normal distribution with mean µ and variance σ 2 /γ. After doing this manipulation one can utilize Theorem 1 to note that γ < 1 generates a monotone dispersion of the original distribution with greater variance, while a monotone concentration with less variance is the outcome if γ > 1.
Despite being true for the normal distribution, it is not the case for all distributions that a monotone dispersion implies greater variance and that a monotone concentration has less variance. Consider the beta distribution B(a, b) which is The reason variance does not have a consistent relationship with monotone dispersions and concentrations is because it is a measure of dispersion from the mean of the distribution. For a consistent relation with monotone dispersion and concentration it is necessary to have a measure of dispersion that is independent of reference points. As will be shown before the end of the current section, a distribution's information entropy, as defined in Shannon (1948) , is a measure of dispersion or uncertainty that invariably increases for monotone dispersions and decreases for monotone concentrations.
Definition 2 (Information Entropy, (Shannon, 1948) ). For any distribution g : Ω → R ++ , the information entropy of g is given by
For any distribution g and particular ω ∈ Ω, Tribus (1961) 
the surprisal of ω. Because − log g(ω) is decreasing in g(ω), surprisal is greater for ω which (according to g) are less likely, more surprising outcomes. The logarithm ensures that surprisal is additive in the densities of independent random variables, as for any two independent random variables X and Y respectively distributed g X and g Y , the surprisal for any particular pair of events (x, y) is
Defining − log g(ω) as the surprisal suggests that the information entropy of a distribution is equivalent to the expected surprisal, as entropy is equivalent to weighting the surprisal for each ω ∈ Ω by the associated density g(ω) and ag-11 Entropy is usually introduced using a discrete distribution g, for which the entropy is defined analogously as H(g) ≡ − Ω g(ω) log c g(ω), where the base c determines unit of measure (e.g. bits for c = 2). The concept defined in Definition 2 is usually known as differential entropy or continuous entropy and is typically denoted with h rather than H. The continuous version is studied because, for our purposes, its analysis is not as straightforward and the results for discrete distributions follow by analogy.
One reason that information theorists typically present entropy using discrete densities is because the entropy of a discrete distribution can be interpreted as the average length of code necessary for the efficient transmission of information regarding outcomes from that distribution. For a coin flip the length of the average code should be − 1 /2 log 2 ( 1 /2) − 1 /2 log 2 ( 1 /2) = 1 bit per signal because it would be efficient to let, say, 1 encode heads and 0 encode tails. However, for some continuous distributions this interpretation of entropy is nonsensical because the entropy could be negative. For example, the uniform distribution over [0, 1 /2] has entropy − gregating over Ω. Distributions with higher entropy then can be interpreted as having higher expected surprisal. If outcomes from one distribution are, on average, more surprising than outcomes from another distribution, then the first distribution can be thought of as containing less information than the second.
Thus, distributions with higher entropy typically generate observations that have less information content.
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The following theorem verifies the claim that transforming a distribution by monotone dispersion results in an increase in entropy and that monotone concentration decreases entropy.
Theorem 3. Let Γ be a monotone dispersion of g. Then the entropy of Γ is at least as great as the entropy of g. That is
If, in addition, either of the sets {ω : g(ω) > Γ(ω)} or {ω : g(ω) < Γ(ω)} have positive measure, then the inequality is strict.
Are Two Weights Necessary?
Putting more weight on the prior is qualitatively dual to putting less on the likelihood function, and vice-versa. This duality suggests that perhaps one can represent any given weighted posterior distribution with just one parameter, effectively restricting the other to one. For example, one could model a bias that involves over-weighting prior information relative to non-prior information in two possible ways with the weighted updating model: put a weight of one on the likelihood function and a weight greater than one on the prior distribution, or put a weight of one the prior distribution and a weight less than one on the likelihood function. Could these approaches be equivalent, in that they are capable of resulting in identical weighted posterior distributions?
It is straightforward to see that this would not generally be the case. If it were, then, for example, given any h t there would exist some c > 0 such that
for all θ ∈ Θ. But since α, β, h t , and c are fixed, expression (5) represents γ as an implicit function of θ. In other words γ would not necessarily be a constant.
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Despite the fact that both parameters are necessary to study an entire weighted posterior distributionπ, it may still be useful to transform the distribution so that there is effectively one parameter. For example, if one were to study point estimates by maximum likelihood (the subject of Section 5), then maximizing eitherπ 1 α orπ 1 β would yield the same estimate of θ as maximizingπ, since taking anything to these powers is a monotonic transformation.
14 information content of observations on average. Any continuous, monotonically increasing function T that is concave (convex) yields a monotone dispersion (concentration). Surely there are other families of transformations that depict certain biases in a more realistic fashion than weighted updating. Why focus on exponential weighting? This section supplies two arguments in support of the use of weighted updating. The first argument details how weighted updating follows from two simple axioms regarding how biased beliefs might be formed. The second argument explains how weighted updating is both parsimonious and tractible -two desirable characteristics for all scientific models.
Monotonicity & Proportional Elasticity
Besides being both tractable and parsimonious, exponential weighting follows from imposing a pair of axioms on belief formation. For both axioms let T : R + → R + be a transformation and g : Ω → R + be a distribution, such that T • g is a distribution. Note also, the axioms require that g and T • g are continuous distributions.
Axiom 1 (Monotonicity). The transformation T is monotonically increasing.
Axiom 2 (Proportional Elasticity). For each ω ∈ Ω, the elasticity of the change in T • g given a change in ω is proportional to the elasticity of a change in g. That is, if T • g and g are differentiable at ω,
for some k ∈ R.
Axiom 1 ensures that ordinal rankings regarding the densities on Ω are identical between g and T • g. In other words if ω 1 is more likely than ω 2 according to g, then ω 1 is also more likely than ω 2 according to T • g. Note that a strict version of Axiom 1 implies conditions (2) and (3) from Definition 1. Thus, any pair of distributions related through a transformation that violates Axiom 1 could not be a monotonic dispersion or concentration of one another. By Theorem 3, we know that monotonic dispersion and concentration is the essence of bias due to mistakes involving how informative observations are. In light of this, Axiom 1 seems quite natural and uncontroversial given the scope of this paper.
While Axiom 1 imposes an ordinal restriction, Axiom 2 restricts the cardinal properties of two distributions related through transformation. That is, Axiom 2 dictates how much densities can vary in a transformed distribution relative to the variation in the original distribution. Specifically, Axiom 2 entails that degrees of belief vary proportionately across the two distributions g and T • g, so a marginal change in ω induces a relative change in g that is proportional to a relative change in T • g, and the factor of proportionality is constant for any given T . Axiom 2 is admittedly much less natural than Axiom 1. As stated previously, there are infinitely many ways in which biases can manifest, even if we only consider those satisfying Axiom 1. At present it seems the only defence for Axiom 2 is that it provides a model that is both parsimonious and tractable, as discussed in the next subsection.
The following theorem proves that only transformations involving exponentiating with a non-negative constant and normalizing satisfy Axioms 1 and 2.
Theorem 4. Let T and g satisfy Axioms 1 and 2. Then there exists some γ ≥ 0
Parsimony & Tractibility
Unfortunately, we do not currently have any idea of which transformations realistically model biased belief formation, so at this nascent stage in our understanding we should strive for characteristics other than realism -characteristics such as parsimony, tractability, and others that make a model valuable in scientific investigation.
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That exponential weighting of a distribution is a parsimonious method of transformation is obvious -it involves doing one fairly basic operation with a single parameter. What about other basic operations that utilize a single parameter?
It is possible to obtain transformations by adding or subtracting some positive constant and then normalizing (and being careful to avoid negative values when subtracting), but doing so typically results in a distribution that is not in the same family as the original distribution and, as such, would in all likelihood be extremely difficult to analyze. Thus, adding or subtracting a real number from each value of a distribution is parsimonious but would often result in a loss in tractability. Multiplying and dividing by some constant does not even result in a transformation, since the operation will be undone by normalizing. So, multiplication and division is parsimonious but entirely ineffectual.
In contrast, exponential weighting is typically both parsimonious and tractable, since the resulting distribution is often of the same family of distributions as the 15 Gabaix and Laibson (2008) list seven key properties for economic models: parsimony, tractability, conceptual insightfulness, generalizability, falsifiability, empirical consistency, and predictive precision. Obviously, the latter two coincide with a model being realistic.
original. This is particularly important for our purposes because tractability can be easily lost when multiplying two distributions as is done in Bayes' rule, which is why Bayesian statisticians tend to study models wherein the prior distribution is conjugate to the likelihood function.
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An illustration of tractability being maintained by exponential weighting is provided by Theorem 5 in Section 5 utilizing Fact 2, that log-concavity is preserved after exponential weighting.
Expanding the Framework
Expression (1 ) introduced the weighted updating model
This introductory model involves two restrictions that can be relaxed in simple ways. These restriction are that (i) the agent treats each datum x j as being exactly as informative as any other datum in h t and (ii) the weights are constant over time. More general frameworks involve discarding either (or both) of these restriction, allowing for different weights on likelihood functions associated with different pieces of data or allowing the weights to vary over time.
Discrimination Between Data
Relaxing the restriction that each x j is weighted by the same weight β involves utilizing the definition of conditional distribution functions, which says that for any t ∈ N and likelihood function f (h t |θ),
Repeated iteration yields
which motivates setting up the weighted updating model as
where α remains the weight on the prior distribution and β j , for each j ∈ {1, . . . , t}, is the weight associated with the jth datum x j . This is a generalization of the introductory framework because (1 ) is a special case of (6), the special case being β j = β for each j ∈ {1, . . . , t}.
If an individual's beliefs evolve according to the weighted updating model in (6), then, compared to a perfect Bayesian, the individual is subjectively treating the component distributions π(θ) α and f (x j |h j−1 , θ) β j for j = 1, . . . , t each as containing either more or less information depending on the levels of α, β 1 , . . . , β t .
As the prior π(θ) summarizes prior information and each likelihood function f (x j |h j−1 , θ) represents the influence of an individual datum x j , the weighted updating model in expression (6) essentially allows the individual to treat the prior information and each datum x j an individualized level of information content.
Additional biases that the generalized weighted updating model (6) is capable of modelling include anchoring; the availablility heuristic; order effects, such as primacy and recency; and self-attribution bias. The remainder of this subsection of the paper discusses how to model these biases with weighted updating. Table   1 summarizes this discussion.
The availability heuristic generates biases due to certain observations being more available in memory . This can be modelled using weighted updating simply by assuming that an economic agent puts higher weights on β j s that correspond to x j s that are relatively memorable.
Order effects occur when the relative position of observations seems to affect beliefs formed from those observations. Experimental subjects typically exhibit either the primacy effect, where earlier observations are more salient than later observations, or the recency effect, where the opposite occurs (Hogarth and Einhorn, 1992) . To model the primacy effect with the weighted updating model would require that β j decreases as j rises, while modelling the recency effect involves assuming that β j is increasing in j.
Self-attribution bias occurs when individuals credit their own ability for desirable outcomes but blame undesirable outcomes on external factors, such as luck.
This suggests that agents put higher weights on x j that are desirable and lower weights on x j that are undesirable. Section 6 contains a more in-depth discussion of self-attribution bias, before it is shown that a decision maker with such a bias will also exhibit optimism bias.
Dynamically Inconsistent Weights
This paper has, up to this point, presented the weighted updating model as one in which the weights are fixed. This subsection discusses relaxing this restriction so that weights can change over time. Recency Effect β j increasing in j Self-Attribution β j low for undesirable outcomes
To allow the weights to change over time simply involves allowing them to be functions of time, which can be defined exogenously or endogenously depending on the nature of the application. Denote these functions α(t) and β(t), so that after observing h t the base weighted updating model in expression (1 ) becomes
A bias that can be modelled with weights that change over time is base-rate neglect. As its name suggests, base-rate neglect involves ignoring prior information. However, subjects who exhibit base-rate neglect typically do not ignore prior information until after they have observed some non-prior information. A classic experiment on base-rate neglect is described in Kahneman and Tversky (1973) .
In this experiment, base rates differed between subjects: one group was told that the descriptions they observed were drawn from a population of 70 lawyers and 30 engineers, while the other group was told that they were drawn from a population with the frequencies reversed, 30 lawyers and 70 engineers. When experimental subjects observed a purposefully uninformative description of a man and were asked to guess whether he is an engineer or a lawyer, the average guess at the probability that the man was an engineer was approximately 50% in both groups.
This base-rate neglect occurred even though the likelihoods participants gave were consistent with base rates before observing the irrelevant information, suggesting that participants utilized base rates then ignored them after observing the uninformative description. Such a phenomenon can be modelled by defining α(t) such that α(0) > 0 (so that agents utilize prior information) and α(t) = 0 for t > 0 (so that they ignore the prior information after observing any history h t ).
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Maximizing the Weighted Updating Model
Although the weighted posterior distributionπ(θ|h t ) fully describes an agent's beliefs regarding θ, it is often useful to work with point estimates. This section considers properties of the likelihood function and prior probability distribution that lend themselves to obtaining point estimates through maximization of the weighted posterior distribution. Relatively few distributions that see widespread use are concave, so it is desirable to consider weaker properties that may be useful for maximizing a weighted posterior distributionπ(θ|h t ). A result below provides that, under typical conditions, log-concavity is the weakest assumption one can make on all of the primitive distributions in Bayes' rule and still be ensured of obtaining unique results from the analysis of first-order conditions.
A function g is (strictly) log-concave if log g is (strictly) concave. Equivalently, if g is (strictly) log-concave then for any λ ∈ (0, 1)
It turns out that many densities commonly used in economics are log-concave.
Perhaps the most notable distribution that is log-concave despite not being concave is the normal distribution.
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The following Theorem provides a set of sufficient conditions, an element of which is log-concavity, for obtaining a unique maximizer of a weighted posterior distribution. This result is a testament to how transforming distributions with exponential weights maintains much tractability, as discussed in Section 3.
Theorem 5. Let α, β 1 , . . . , β t > 0, let Θ be a convex subset of R, and let the prior distribution π(θ) and the likelihood functions f (x j |h j−1 , θ), for all t ∈ N and j ∈ {1, . . . , t}, each be positive-valued, twice continuously differentiable, and log-concave, with at least one of these t + 1 functions strictly log-concave. Theñ
is a continuously differentiable function. Moreover, the sign of the partial derivative ofθ(t) with respect to α is the same as the sign of π (θ(t)) and the sign of the partial derivative with respect to β j is the same as the sign of f θ (x j |h j−1 ,θ(t))
for each j ∈ {1, . . . , t}.
With the other hypotheses given, 19 if any of the likelihood functions or if the prior distribution were not log-concave then the conclusions of Theorem 5
would not necessarily be true without imposing additional structure. As such, as long as the other hypotheses are maintained, it would be fruitless to consider properties weaker than log-concavity (e.g. quasiconcavity) to impose on all of the Figure 2 : An illustration of comparative statics for log-concave weighted updating.
distributions primitive to Bayes' rule and expect to find that they are sufficient for the conclusions obtained in Theorem 5.
The comparative static results from Theorem 5 are thatθ α (t) has the same sign as π (θ(t)) and eachθ β j (t) has the same sign as f θ (x j |h j−1 ,θ(t)). Ceteris paribus, if more weight is put on the prior π(θ) by increasing α thenθ(t) will shift towards the mode of π(θ). Similarly, if more weight is put on the jth datum x j by increasing β j thenθ(t) will shift towards the mode of f θ (x j |h j−1 , θ). Thus, in either case a distribution with greater weight will pull the maximum a posteriori estimate towards its maximum. Figure 2 illustrates the comparative statics results using the introductory weighted updating model (1). It compares a perfect Bayesian (solid curves) with a weighted updater (dashed curves) who is putting a weight of 1 /2 on the likelihood function associated with h t . Notice that the maximum for the Bayesian's posterior distribution π(θ|h t ) is at θ = 7 /12 and that at this point the slope of the likelihood function is negative: f (h t | 7 /12) < 0, suggesting that a decrease in α will induce an increase in the value of θ that maximizes the posterior distribution. This is indeed the case, as the maximum of the weighted updating modelπ(θ|h t ) is at θ = 2 /3 > 7 /12.
Modelling Optimism Bias via Self-Attribution
This section utilizes some of the findings from previous sections of the paper in an application of the weighted updating model. Specifically, this section illustrates how the weighted updating model can be used show that optimism bias can be caused by self-attribution bias.
One of the hallmarks of optimism bias is the statistical impossibility of individuals who, on average, expect to do better than average in some realm of their lives. A classic example is provided by Weinstein (1980) , who finds that students expect to live longer and be healthier than their peers, while believing themselves less likely to experience negative outcomes such as divorce and heart attacks. In regards to how optimism bias occurs, Sharot, Riccardi, Raio, and Phelps (2007) find differences in areas of the brain activated depending on whether imagined future events were desirable or not, and the differences suggest a heightened role for areas of the brain associated with monitoring emotional salience when desirable outcomes are imagined.
Evidence suggests that optimism bias has measurable effects on peoples' beliefs in many facets of life, including those that are economic in nature. Hoch (1985) finds that business school students overestimate their job prospects. Weinstein and Klein (1996) find that smokers tend to believe other smokers are more likely to suffer from lung cancer than themselves. In a cross-country analysis, Koellinger, Minniti, and Schade (2007) find an association between optimism and business start-ups and a negative association between optimism and survival of new firms. Let us assume that higher levels of x t are in some sense desirable, so that somebody who exhibits optimism bias expects higher levels of x t than a perfect Bayesian who has witnessed the same history and has the same prior. 20 Modelling this requires that the parameter θ defines some sort of stochastic ordering so that either higher or lower levels of θ are associated with higher levels of x t in each period. 21 Without loss of generality, greater θ are associated with larger x t .
The stochastic ordering utilized is the strict single crossing property defined by Milgrom and Shannon (1994) . This property is chosen over other stochastic orders because of its generality and because it is maintained under monotone dispersion and concentration, making it particularly useful for analyses involving 20 It may be helpful to think of x t as income. 21 If one thinks of x t as income, then values of θ might represent beliefs about one's earning power ("ability", in a loose sense). the weighted updating model. If g(y, ω) satisfies the strict single crossing property in (ω; y) then for all y > y and ω > ω it is true that g(y, ω ) ≥ g(y, ω) ⇒ g(y , ω ) > g(y , ω).
We will assume that likelihood functions f satisfy the strict single crossing property in (θ; x). The essence of this assumption is that in the case that after witnessing some level of x t the decision maker views θ as more likely than θ, where θ > θ, it follows that had a higher level of x t been witnessed then θ would still have been deemed more likely than θ.
We will model optimism bias by assuming that an individual will put more weight on likelihood functions associated with high levels of x t and less weight on lower levels of x t than a perfect Bayesian. Determination of which are higher and lower levels of x t will be depend upon a reference level, which is defined as the minimal level of x t+1 that would be sufficient forθ(t + 1) ≥θ(t).
22 That is, the reference level immediately after observing h t is
The weights the individual who exhibits optimism bias will utilize are β t = β(x t , t) > 0, where each function β(x, t) − 1 has a single crossing at x =x(t − 1).
That is, for all t ∈ N,
Now it can be shown that under such a setup optimism bias will occur, in that regardless of the history h t an individual who forms beliefs according to these rules will believe θ is greater than a Bayesian who has observed the same history and has the same prior distribution π(θ).
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Proposition 1. Let Θ be a convex subset of R, and let the prior distribution π(θ) and the likelihood functions f (x j |h j−1 , θ), for all t ∈ N and j ∈ {1, . . . , t}, each be positive-valued, twice continuously differentiable, and strictly log-concave. Also, let each likelihood function f satisfy the strict single crossing property in (θ; x) and let the functions β(x t , t) for each t be consistent with (8). Then for all t ∈ N,
f (x t |h j−1 , θ).
A model of optimism bias such as this one can be used in any number of applications. A few that come to mind are (i) a job-search model where the job hunter is overly-optimistic about future job offers and turns down offers that a perfect bayesian would accept, (ii) a price-setting firm that is overly-optimistic regarding stochastic demand and thereby sets prices higher than would be profit-23 It may be of interest to note that the necessity that the reference levelx(t) changes over time stems from the fact that relatively weak assumptions were used regarding β(x, t). If β is monotonically increasing in x then a constant reference level would be sufficient for optimism bias to manifest.
maximizing,
24 and (iii) a firm that over-estimates the expected return on an investment project from which a perfect Bayesian would abstain.
Conclusion
This paper presents weighted updating as a gnereralization of Bayes' rule that is capable of systematically producing biased judgement in economic agents. The paper provides an interpretation of weighted updating as a method by which individuals treat information as either more or less informative than under Bayes'
rule. In particular, it is shown that weighting the functions primitive to Bayes' rule transforms the functions by monotone dispersion or monotone concentration, and that these transformations affect the information entropy of the resulting primitives.
This paper also shows that the law of total probability applied to the likelihood function in Bayes' rule motivates modelling discrimination between nonprior information with the weighted updating model. This formulation establishes weighted updating as a candidate for modelling numerous bias where individuals treat different pieces of data differently. It also discusses how it is possible to utilize dynamically inconsistent weights in the model, and how such a framework allows one to model base-rate neglect, a bias which was previously considered beyond the reach of what weighted updating is capable of modelling.
A result in the paper shows that point estimates for maximum a posteriori estimation of a weighted updating model can be found under fairly general conditions. It remains to determine whether there are other reasonably relevant sets of sufficient conditions that yield such results and make for straightforward analysis of comparative statics. Also, there are other types of estimation procedures to consider, such as the expected value of θ given the posterior distributionπ(θ|h t ).
As an applied example, the paper also discusses how it is possible to model optimism bias via self-attribution bias using weighted updating.
Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1. Let γ ∈ (0, 1). Conditions (2) and (3) are satisfied immediately. As g is non-uniform there exists a pair (ω 1 , ω 2 ) ∈ Ω 2 for which g(ω 1 ) > g(ω 2 ). For any such pair, multiplying each term of the relations 0 < γ < 1 by log(g(ω 1 )/g(ω 2 )) yields
which implies that
Dividing both the numerator and denominator of the center term by the normal-
which is another way of stating that
This proves that Γ is a monotone dispersion of g. The case for γ > 1 yielding a monotone concentration is proved analogously.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 2. Let
As Γ is a monotone dispersion of g, g(ω 1 ) > g(ω 2 ) implies
which can be rearranged to obtain
Now utilize g(ω 2 ) ≥ Γ(ω 2 ) to augment the above inequality to obtain
And so, g(ω 1 ) > Γ(ω 1 ). The other case implying the opposite conclusion is symmetric.
Proof of Corollary 1. As
we have g(ω * ) ≥ g(ω) for each ω ∈ Ω. The hypothesis that Γ is a monotone dispersion of g implies that both Γ and g are non-uniform, so there exists some
Note that expression (3) from Definition 1 guarantees that this inequality is strict at ω = ω 0 . These conditions imply
with strict in inequality for ω = ω 0 . As these conditions hold for all ω ∈ Ω with strict inequality at ω 0 , integrating over Ω yields
As both g and Γ are probability distributions, they integrate to unity over their support, so this condition is equivalent to
,
The proof of Theorem 3 requires the following two lemmas and a fact (Gibb's Inequality) from statistical physics.
Proof. Let b = sup g({ω : g(ω) < Γ(ω)}) and B = inf g({ω : g(ω) > Γ(ω)}).
Suppose for purposes of contradiction that b > B. Then completeness of the
and
By the definition of monotone dispersion and monotone concentration, Γ(ω 1 ) >
). This, the above two conditions, and the fact that Γ is positive on its support Ω imply
contradicting the fact that Γ is a monotone dispersion of g, expression (4) in particular. Therefore it must be the case that b ≤ B.
Q.E.D.
Lemma 2. Let Γ be a monotone dispersion of g and let there exist some ω j such that Γ(ω j ) > g(ω j ). Then there exists r ∈ R such that
Proof. Corollary 1 guarantees the existence of some 
contradicting Γ is a monotone dispersion of g. As it cannot be the case that
The hypothesis that there exists some ω j such that Γ(ω j ) > g(ω j ) establishes the existence of ω ∈ Ω such that Γ(ω) < b, as b is defined in the proof of Lemma 1. A symmetric argument to the above guarantees that Γ(ω) > g(ω) whenever
Thus, for any r ∈ [b, B], which is non-empty by Lemma 1, it follows that
We will make use of the following fact from the field of statistical physics.
Fact 1 (Gibbs' Inequality). For any two probability distributions p, q :
Proof of Theorem 3. By Gibbs' Inequality
Lemma 1 asserts that [b, B] is non-empty. Consider any r ∈ [b, B]. As, g and Γ are both distributions,
Adding expressions (9) and (10) gives
By Lemma 2, r ∈ [b, B] implies that log Γ(ω) − log r has the same sign as g(ω) − Γ(ω), so the right-hand side of expression (11) is non-negative. And so,
If, additionally, {ω : g(ω) > Γ(ω)} or {ω : g(ω) < Γ(ω)} have positive measure then the right-hand side of expression (11) is strictly positive, so inequality (12) is strict.
Proof of Theorem 4. We have from Axiom 2
Solving this differential equation implies that
for some c > 0 and k ∈ R. Let γ = k. The fact that γ ≥ 0 follows from Axiom 1. The value of c is determined by the fact that T • g is a distribution which
Fact 2. For any γ (>) ≥ 0, if a function g : Ω → R is (strictly) log-concave then
The following results provide properties due to log-concavity that are useful for maximizing the weighted updating model. Note that only the strict cases are shown in all proofs, as the non-strict cases are nearly identical.
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Proof. For any (ω 1 , ω 2 ) ∈ Ω 2 and any λ ∈ (0, 1) it is necessary that
Taking logs, multiplying each side by γ > 0, and some rearranging yield
Fact 3. For any γ > 0, if a function g : Ω → R is (strictly) log-concave then γg : Ω → R is (strictly) log-concave.
Proof. Multiplying each side of the strict case of expression (7) by γ and distributing on the right-hand side yield
Fact 4. If f, g ⊂ Ω × R + are both log-concave functions then their pointwise product, denoted f g, is log-concave. If, in addition, either f or g is strictly logconcave and both are positive then f g is strictly log-concave.
Proof. Without loss of generality, let f be strictly log-concave and g log-concave.
For any λ ∈ (0, 1) it follows that
All values in these expressions are positive, so multiplying left-hand sides and right-hand sides and utilizing the f g notation yield
Facts 2, 3, and 4 imply the following result.
Corollary 2. For α, β 1 , . . . , β t ≥ 0, if the likelihood functions f (x j |h j−1 , θ) and the prior distribution π(θ) are log-concave then the weighted posterior distribution π(θ|h t ) is log-concave on Θ. If any one of the likelihood functions or the prior distribution is strictly log-concave and if the weight on that function is strictly positive thenπ(θ|h t ) is strictly log-concave
Proof. Let α, β 1 , . . . , β t ≥ 0 and π(θ), f (x 1 |θ), . . . , f (x t |h t−1 , θ) be log-concave and at least one of them strictly so. By Fact 2, each of the functions
are log concave. Moreover, the weighted version of any strictly log concave function is strictly log concave. Fact 4 ensures that the product
is strictly log-concave. Finally, since the marginal distribution
is a positive constant (i.e. not a function of θ), dividing expression (13) by (14) to obtainπ(θ|h t ) yields a strictly log-concave function by Fact 3.
Q.E.D.
Corollary 2 asserts that if the prior distribution and likelihood functions primitive to Bayes rule are log-concave, then any associated weighted posterior distribution is log concave as long as the weights are all non-negative. Moreover, if any one of the primitive distributions is strictly log-concave and its weight positive, then, as long as the others are log-concave, the weighted posterior distribution is strictly log-concave. Strict log-concavity is very useful in maximization, because it ensures that any maximum is a unique global maximum.
The following fact of log-concavity will prove useful.
Fact 5. If g : R → R + is log-concave and twice continuously differentiable then
This inequality is strict if g is strictly log-concave.
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Proof. A twice continuously differentiable function f is strictly concave if f < 0.
As a function g is strictly log-concave if and only if log g is strictly concave, or (log g) < 0 which yields expression (15).
Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 5. Ignoring the marginal distribution and taking the natural logarithm is a monotonic transformation, leaving the problem max θ∈Θ α log π(θ) + t j=1 β j log f (x j |h j−1 , θ).
The first-order condition of maximization with respect to θ is α π (θ(t)) π(θ(t)) + t j=1 β j f θ (x j |h j−1 ,θ(t)) f (x j |h j−1 ,θ(t)) = 0,
By Corollary 2,π(x t |h t , θ) is strictly log-concave soθ(t) is a unique maximum on Θ. To prove that (16) definesθ(t) as a continuously differentiable function 26 For g(x) > 0, rearranging expression (15) provides an illuminating implication of logconcavity when a function is twice continuously differentiable:
Thus, the second derivative of a log-concave function can be positive, which contrasts with the fact that a concave and twice continuously differentiable function has non-negative second derivative on its domain. This is one way of illustrating that log-concavity is a weaker condition than concavity.
of (α, β 1 , . . . , β t , h t ) allows for use of the implicit function theorem, a sufficient condition of which is the derivative of the left-hand side of (16) with respect to θ is non-zero atθ(t). In fact, it will be shown that this derivative is negative, which is also the second-order condition for maximization. This derivative is ∂FOC ∂θ ≡ α π (θ(t))π(θ(t)) − π (θ(t)) 2 π(θ(t)) 2 + t j=1 β j f θθ (x j |h j−1 ,θ(t))f (x j |h j−1 ,θ(t)) − f θ (x j |h j−1 ,θ(t)) 2 f (x j |h j−1 ,θ(t)) 2
By hypothesis, α, β 1 , . . . , β t > 0. The denominators of each term are also positive.
Utilizing Fact 5, log-concavity of all of the functions π(θ), f (x 1 |θ), . . . , f (x t |h t−1 , θ)
implies that all of the numerators are non-positive and since at least one of these functions is strictly log-concave at least one of the numerators is negative. Thus, ∂FOC ∂θ < 0, establishing that the fist-order condition (16) definesθ(t) as a continuously differentiable implicit function of (α, β 1 , . . . , β t , h t ).
The comparative static results are found by solving for the appropriate derivatives after finding the expressions for:
for each j ∈ {1, . . . , t}. Respectively, these derivatives arẽ θ α (t) = − π (θ(t)) π(θ(t)) ∂FOC ∂θ andθ β j (t) = − f θ (x j |h j−1 ,θ(t)) f (x j |h j−1 ,θ(t)) ∂FOC ∂θ .
To determine the signs of these expressions first note that ∂FOC ∂θ < 0, which essentially cancels out the minus sign in each expression. Combining these with the facts π(θ(t)) > 0 and f (x j |h j−1 ,θ(t)) > 0, for each j, implies that the signs of these expressions are respectively the same as the signs of π (θ(t)) and f θ (x j |h j−1 ,θ(t)).
Proof of Proposition 1. As, π(θ|h t ) ∝π(θ|h t−1 )f (x t |h t−1 , θ) β(xt,t)
we can write the first-order condition of maximization for the weighted updater asπ θ (θ(t)|h t−1 ) π(θ(t)|h t−1 ) + β(x t , t) f θ (x t |h t−1 ,θ(t)) f (x t |h t−1 ,θ(t)) = 0.
This first-order condition implies that the signs ofπ θ and f θ are either opposite or both zero atθ(t). There are two cases to consider.
Case 1 : x t ≥x(t−1). In this case, the single crossing property on f guarantees that arg max θ∈Θ f (x t |θ) ≥θ(t − 1).
As both f (x t |θ) andπ(θ|h t−1 ) are log-concave on Θ, this implies that f θ ≥π θ at θ(t). So f θ ≥ 0 since it must have sign opposite that ofπ θ . The comparative static results from Theorem 5 implies thatθ β j (t) ≥ 0. Since in this case β j ≥ 1 and θ β j (t) ≥ 0, it is necessary that the weighted updater will increase their maximizing value of θ at least as much as the perfect Bayesian.
Case 2 : x t <x(t − 1). Now the single crossing property on f implies arg max θ∈Θ f (x t |θ) <θ(t − 1).
Using arguments analogous to those in Case 1 entailsθ β j (t) < 0. Also, as β j < 1 in this case andθ β j (t) < 0, the weighted updater will decrease the maximizing value of θ strictly less than the perfect Bayesian will.
We have determined that it is either the case that the weighted updater will increase the maximized value of θ at least as much or will decrease the maximized value of θ less than the perfect Bayesian will. As it is assumed that they have identical prior distributions π(θ), which are strictly log-concave and therefore have unique and identical maximizers, the weighted updater's maximizing value of θ can never be less than that of the perfect Bayesian.
